There is empirical evidence that the introduction of the euro led to a signifi cant increase of perceived infl ation in most countries. Such an increase and persistence in the perceived infl ation might then have an impact on infl ation expectations and other macroeconomic variables. The authors have used expectational errors to describe the difference between infl ation expectations/anticipations and its observed values, subsequently to identify the causality between these variables.
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the so-called perceived infl ation as observed in the Eurozone countries from the time of euro changeover in 2002. The authors analyzed the empirical paradox presented by the fact that the majority of consumers in Eurozone countries had a feeling that euro introduction caused pronounced overall price growth, when in fact offi cial statistical data measuring the actual course of infl ation (e.g., the HICP -Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) did not bear out these fears to any signifi cant extent.
What risks are actually connected to growth in perceived infl ation after introduction of the euro that justify attention to it? Primarily it is the fact that perceived infl ation may infl uence the infl ationary expectations of economic actors. In this way, perceived infl ation upon introduction of the euro could lead to unpleasant risks associated with accelerated infl ation if such subjective feelings were to be refl ected in concrete price and wage decisions.
In this paper, we shall attempt to identify the most important arguments presented in the literature on perceived infl ation, simultaneously summarizing what has been learned from studies in both categories. The authors use expectational errors, based on the short-term Phillips curve assumptions, to describe the difference between infl ation expectations and its current values.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the theory and empiricism on the gap between measured and perceived infl ation. Section 2 then builds up the theoretical framework based on the short-term Phillips curve approach and derives two hypotheses, to be tested subsequently. Section 3 provides the methodology. Section 4 presents the modelling and results of the empirical analysis. In Section 5 authors compare its results and used methodology with papers and studies on a similar topic. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides recommendations for the economic policy.
Theory and Empiricism on the Gap between Measured and Perceived
Infl ation Gylfason (1980) 
states the following: "It is interesting to note that while an increase in the expected rate of infl ation increases consumption by infl uencing intertemporal choice, an increase in the price level may at the same time reduce consumption through the Pigou effect. There is inconsistency between the argument that increased
1 If citizens have the "feeling" that prices are growing in spite of the offi cial statistics, perceived infl ation may lead to a certain amount of disorientation among members of the public. A similarly disjointed view of price development upon introduction of the euro into circulation was an advanced in Germany, among other countries, where -in spite of the fact that statistics showed the introduction of the euro had no profound impact on infl ation -the term "Teuro" came into being, fusing "teuer", which is German for "expensive", with "euro".
2 Growth in perceived infl ation is likely one cause of the mixed feelings residents of the eurozone had about the introduction of the common European currency. Surveys like the Flash Eurobarometer (2010) show that the specter of perceived infl ation also threatens countries outside the eurozone, where the public was also afraid in advance that the introduction of the euro would lead to higher prices.
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See ECB (2002a) , ECB (2002b) , Aucremanne et al. (2007) or Sturm et al. (2009) .
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The most important of these are Brachinger (2006) , Jonas et al. (2002) or Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) .
infl ation stimulates consumption at the expense of savings and the fact that in the recession of 1974-1975 high infl ation rates and high savings coincided in many industrial countries." ... and continues … "Even though increased infl ation stimulates via increased consumption output and employment in the short run, it may still be detrimental to economic growth as time passes."
The authors of this article assume that exogenous negative shock to an individual wealth ceteris paribus reduces the expected future consumption, therefore increasing the marginal utility of future consumption. To maintain the equilibrium, the marginal utility of the current consumption has to rise -i.e. the current consumption has to be reduced. That is, the share of consumption in GDP declines and the personal savings rate increases. The latter, indeed, will mitigate the negative wealth shock, but it cannot eliminate it. The savings suffi cient to increase wealth to its pre-shock levels -and hence to resume the original level of consumption -would violate the individual budget constraint. Because the consumption still remains exogenous of GDP -but not vice versa -the reduction in consumption reduces the GDP's growth.
Signifi cant exogenous negative shock that leads to the expected future consumption reduction is a positive gap between the current and perceived infl ation as well. To clarify the term "perceived infl ation" we have to look at psychological terminology. In psychology and cognitive sciences perception is defi ned as "the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting and organizing sensory information" (Federal Statistical Offi ce of Germany, 2006) . The ECB (2007) provides the following interpretation of the link between perceived infl ation, infl ation expectations and other economic variables: "…protracted divergences in the evolution of measured perceived infl ation warrant close examination, given that perceived infl ation might have an impact on infl ation expectations and other macroeconomic variables."
As will be discussed later, the above-mentioned defi nition is in line with the methodology of the perceived infl ation survey conducted by the European Commission. The indicator of perceived infl ation is not constructed with the use of empirical price monitoring. It surveys the feelings of consumers about the past and future price development. Consumer opinions on infl ation are collected through the Consumer Survey of the European Commission (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs). As the indicator derived from this survey differs in nature from the HICP, it is not possible to make a direct comparison between the two measures. In order to interpret its dynamics, it is important to gain a better understanding of the methodology used to calculate the European Commission indicator. More details are provided in the methodological part of the paper. There are many arguments why a gap between measured (HICP) and perceived infl ation may have occurred in the aftermath of the euro changeover. The infl ation perceptions are mostly based on the price changes of frequently purchased products, different perceptions of price increases and decreases, price shocks and asymmetries in perceptions between the lower priced items and in sectors where price transparency and market concentration are low. For the next part of this paper it is important that "... since 2002 consumers have tended to perceive that infl ation is high, while in reality it was relatively low, albeit slightly above the quantifi ed defi nition of price stability for the euro area." (Aucremann, Collin, Stragier, 2007, p. 24) Kichler, E. (2006) provides the following argument: "Dealing with the new currency essentially depends on the understanding of the nominal euro values, which can be derived from two different sources". On the one hand, euro amounts can be evaluated on the basis of an interaction of nominal and real representations, which leads to a bias toward nominal valuation (Shafi r, Diamond and Tversky, 1997) . This bias is infl uenced, inter alia, by the salience of nominal values as well as simple and careful mental calculation processes and is referred to as money illusion (Dimand, 2002) . In the context of the infl uence of the respective former currencies and conversion factors on the perception of euro amounts also the term "euro illusion" was coined (Burgoyne, Routh and Ellis, 1999; Gamble, Gärling, Västfjäll and Marell, 2003) . On the other hand, the evaluation of euro amounts can be infl uenced by specifi c other values, such as the price one remembers in the former currency or random values. Finally, it is questionable to which periods persons relate estimated infl ation rates and to what extent time leads to distorted perceptions. Kemp and Willetts (1996) , for example, showed that infl ation rates tend to be overestimated by far for the more recent past, while subjective estimates for longer periods lead to a gross underestimation of infl ation rates.
Studies of Döhring, B., Mordonu, A. (2007) and Lacina (2008) provide sets of factors that attempted to explain the existence and persistence of a perceived infl ation indicator and its deviation from HICP. The following part of the paper describes some of most frequently mentioned factors in both studies.
In most of the euro-area countries the prices of day-to-day purchases of so called "out-of-the-pocket" items (for example food, dinners in restaurants) were growing faster than the prices of less frequent purchases (like cars, refrigerators, etc.) . The prices of some products even declined while increasing their utility (for example computers, electronic devices). Due to the fact that consumers are more "sensitive" to changes of day-to-day purchases than to the products with long-term utility, they transfer their feelings about price increases in this group of products to their opinion about overall infl ation (the whole consumer basket). At the same time psychological studies show that consumers are more sensitive to the price increases in comparison to price decreases. While evaluating the development of prices in the past the surveyed consumers were giving signifi cantly higher weight to the products with price increases compared with those with price decreases.
According to public opinion surveys (Eurobarometers) even 6 years after the euro introduction (cash form) there was still a high percentage of respondents that convert the euro prices to the former national currency. But doing so, they are comparing current prices with prices that existed 6 years prior (at the end of the year 2001).
An important role is also played by expectations. While the consumers (due to media information, conversations with neighbours, declarations of europessimistic politicians, etc.) acquire the strong believe that the introduction of the euro will lead to price increases, they have a tendency to increase their opinion about future development of infl ation by their expectations and acquired information in the past. Once expectations about the development of prices after the euro's introduction are set, they have the tendency to be transformed to the long-term increase in perceived infl ation compared to the infl ation measured by standard price indices like HICP.
Any household is an "ideal" consumer according to the weighted structure of the consumer basket. Logically the higher is the weight in consumption given to the groups of products with higher increases of prices than average (during the euro changeover -like food products), and the higher is then an increase in the indicator of perception infl ation.
One of the most mentioned causes of a signifi cant opening of scissors between perceived infl ation and infl ation measured by HICP is the unawareness of consumers about the structure of the consumer basket and calculation of the consumer price index.
An important fact why the consumer may feel that prices went signifi cantly up after the euro introduction is the statistically observed increase of houses prices after the year 2001 (which has nothing to do with the euro introduction). However, therefore the prices of houses are not included in the calculation of HICP, the people that do not know the structure of the consumer basket that is used for HICP calculation, may feel the cost of living is growing. They can then wrongly transform their feelings about the decrease in their purchasing power to the fact that prices went up. The feeling that "costs of living are increasing" may be infl uenced not just by increases of prices included (or excluded -real estate) in HICP, but also by the slower growth of wages compared with past developments before euro introduction (due to the attempt of the national government to control infl ation growth during the euro changeover, as in Slovenia) or other factors that do not have any direct relation to the euro introduction. Again the people have a tendency to transform their feeling about the decline of purchasing power of their incomes due to the slowdown in nominal wage growth to the introduction of the euro.
An important role in the formation, growth and long-term persistence of perceived infl ation are played by information provided by mass media. In countries implementing the euro in the past there was, according to media monitoring, a signifi cant increase in the number of papers covering the topic of infl ation. As far as the media have a tendency to choose more "sensational" information (in contrast with rational arguments) in the context of euro changeover, they preferred to be alert mainly to price increases. The media also increased the number of papers analyzing the problem of the offi cial price statistics' credibility (as perceived infl ation signifi cantly deviated from HICP before and after euro introduction) and thus creating the opinion that offi cial statistics (like HICP) are providing wrong information about price development for the decisions of consumers.
The following table describes the development of HICP and the perceived infl ation indicator in individual Eurozone member countries after euro adoption. As we can see there was no signifi cant increase in HICP in any observed country. The opposite is true for the indicator of perceived infl ation. In all countries except Finland there was a signifi cant increase in the perceived infl ation indicator. What is interesting is that in some countries after the dramatic increase of indicator after euro introduction in cash form (period 2002-2004) , the value of the indicator started decreasing. In some countries the indicator remained fi xed at a high level. In no country did the indicator of a perceived infl ation come back to its former level until the end of 2006.
The signifi cance of the gap between the current and perceived infl ation is discussed in the next parts of the paper.
Theoretical Framework of the Paper
The theoretical background of the relationship between the infl ation perceptions and current infl ation is possible to fi nd in the short-term Phillips curve. This relationship describes differences between the infl ation expectations and its current values, subsequently identifi es impact of this differences on the other economic indicators. The common theoretical argument explaining the differences is based on the slow adjustment of prices in the short-term. This limit in the adjustment mechanism is used by monetary and fi scal policy makers in the process of infl ation and unemployment determination in the real economy in the short-term. Friedman (1968) gives a theoretical framework for the Phillips curve, in which he introduces the adaptive expectations. The adaptive expectation hypothesis states that price level is given in the short-run, but moves slowly to correct for past expectational errors: (Heijdra, Ploeg, 2002, p. 8) Assume the substitution of the expectational errors from the formula (1) with the perception errors that represent the gap between perceived and current infl ation.
Under the adaptive expectation hypothesis and neo-Keynesian assumptions, expansion of the nominal money supply lowers the interest rate and pushes up aggregate demand in the short-run. With the aggregate demand and national income increasing, the price level rises too. Over time the expected price level is revised upwards and aggregate supply shifts back until the equilibrium of employment and output are reached again. The fi nal recommendation for the policy-makers leads to an assumption of neutrality money in the long-run but not in the short-run. Concurrently, Milton Friedman and other monetarists assumed that there is a temporary effect of nominal money supply expansion on the real output under the adaptive expectation hypothesis.
The problem of expectations was further discussed by Muth (1961) . He argues that "expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2011  127 the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory." (Muth, 1961, p. 316) According to this assumption, the agents can calculate a future correct price level for the new money supply after the monetary policy expansion is implied. The expectational error () e t PP  from the form (1) disappeared. The rational expectations hypothesis defi nes an expectational equilibrium as follows:
From the supply side view, the suppliers must decide on the production capacity before knowing exactly what will be the price at which they can sell their goods. The agents make their decisions on the basis of all information that is available to them. They know prices in the period t-1 and t. According to the rational expectations hypothesis, there is no signifi cant and permanent gap between the future, past and current infl ation rates and its perceptions. However, there is not direct substitution between the rational and adaptive expectation hypothesis. Formula (1) which represents adaptive expectational error could be rewritten in the form:
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Obviously, while the rational expectation hypothesis is forward-looking, the adaptive expectation hypothesis is backward-looking. Assume that expectations play a crucial role in economic reality. If the current price level is different from perceived prices:
there is a signifi cant causality between the physical magnitudes of infl ation and its perceived intensity. This idea is based on the Weber-Fechner law (Gerrit, 2008) . Although the differences between the infl ation and its perceptions disappear in the long run, the short-term Phillips curve is impacted. In this paper, the empirical analysis focuses on the infl ation perceptions and its relationship with the rational and adaptive expectation hypothesis. The expectations-augmented Phillips curve indicates that when expectations of future infl ation (the future price level) are totally accurate, so that current unemployment equals to its natural level:
where e it  represents infl ation expectations, π it current infl ation, n it U is the natural rate of unemployment, 5 U it its current level and v it unexpected exogenous supply shocks. On the opposite site of the original version of the Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958) where only one Phillips curve exists, the expectation-augmented Phillips curve supposes an infi nite number of the curves for each expected infl ation rate.
In the empirical analysis, the authors test the hypothesis to see if there is a signifi cant expectational error between the current infl ation and its perceptions () In the empirical analysis to estimate the natural level of unemployment the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter is used.
Technical Background
The perceived infl ation indicator is based on infl ation perceptions in the consumer survey of the standardized balance statistic conducted by the European Commission. This statistic is the result of the question: "How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?" There are six possible answers to the question on infl ation perceptions: A(1), "risen a lot", A(2), "risen moderately", A(3), "risen slightly", A(4), "stayed about the same", A(5), "fallen" and A(6), "do not know". The balance statistic is computed as follows:
(1) 0,5 (2) 0,5 (4)
where i represents country and t time. The statistic B it is in the scale range from -100 to 100. For the empirical analysis a quantifi ed measure of perceived infl ation is needed. s . The equation (7) is reversed in the following form (Aucremanne, Collin, Stragier, 2007) :
Infl ation anticipation is based on the consumer survey of the standardized balance statistic, which is the result of the question on the prices development over the next 12 months. Anticipated infl ation is quantifi ed by the same way (8) as the perceived infl ation.
In the second part of the empirical analysis there will be test of whether there are signifi cant expectational errors () GAP  
The authors verify explicitly whether perceived or/and anticipated infl ation track measured infl ation by the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root over the test period (Aucremanne, Collin, Stragier, 2007 ). If the current price level is permanently different from perceived prices, the GAP it sequence is not stationary (Enders, 2003, pp.185-195 (Aucremanne, Collin, Stragier, 2007) Subsequently, the parameters α (referring to the constant or drift) and (linear time trend) are jointly tested to contribute for the robustness of the empirical analysis results. The F-test is given by
where SSR r represents sum of squared residuals from the restricted equation, SSR u sum of squared residuals from the unrestricted equation, n number of usable observations, k number of the coeffi cients in the unrestricted equation and r represents number of restrictions. (Seddighi, Lawler, Katos, 2000, pp. 262-272) . The joint hypothesis used in the analysis is the following:
H a : not both α i and
Rejection of the unit roots hypothesis indicates stationarity, the fact that there are not signifi cant expectational errors between the anticipated/perceived and currently observed infl ation. Consequently, the current observed infl ation is adjusted by its anticipations and/or perceptions. Another important question of the empirical analysis lies in the assumption of causality between the infl ation anticipations and perceptions. If there are signifi cant expectational errors, aggregate prices are not able to be affected by infl ation perceptions and/or participation. In that case, current observed infl ation is exogenous variable in the relation with the perceived and/or anticipated infl ation. To identify independency between the two variables focus now on the exogeneity defi nition. Assume that the regression relationship is linear:
and transform the model (1) into the next equation:
where the condition   . Analogically there could be defi ned variable x t . To identify the independency between the variables must be defi ned exogenous variable in the equation (14): 
If the empirical analysis fails to reject the hypothesis 12 0   and simultaneously reject the hypothesis 12 0   , the variable y is exogenous. In this case will be rejected the hypothesis about the causality existence between the variables in Granger sense.
Data and Empirical Analysis Results
Tests are applied on monthly data of the harmonized index of consumer prices and consumer surveys in the Eurozone and its 12 Member States for the estimation period 1997:01-2008:12. The unit-root tests are reported in Tables 2, 3 , 4 and 5. The ADF test applied in Tables 2 and 4 use Akaike´s information criterion to identify lag order,  Tables 3 and 5 Schwarz´s Bayesian information criterion. Both of these information criteria determine the appropriate number of lagged differences by adding lags until the Ljung-Box test fails to reject any serial correlation at a defi ned level. The difference between these approaches is that Schwarz´s Bayesian information criterion gives a more parsimonious lag structure.
From the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test point of view, for Italy and Luxembourg, the unit root can be rejected at a 1% signifi cance level. On a 5% signifi cance level this hypothesis is rejected for Belgium and a 10% signifi cance level for the Netherlands and Ireland. Similar results are presented by the joint test. For Italy in the sample, the null of the unit root and no constant is accepted at 1%, for Belgium and Luxembourg at 5% and for the Netherlands at a 10% signifi cance level.
PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2011  131 The level stationarity of infl ation gap between the perceived and current infl ation is expected only in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg. In other Eurozone Member Countries expectational error are signifi cantly assumed in the analyzed period. realistic due to the identifi ed lag order. Short-term period specifi ed in the theoretical background corresponds only to a few months. In the The stationarity test in the level for the gap between the anticipated and current infl ation is present in Tables 3 and 4 . The different results are caused by different criterion to choose lag. The authors prefer Schwarz´s Bayesian information criterion, due to the shorter lags in the Table 5 . Table 6 Granger Non-Causality Test of Perceived Infl ation Table 7 Granger Non-Causality Test of Anticipated Infl ation A signifi cant gap (expectational errors) between anticipated infl ation and HICP is obvious only in Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and EA12 at a 10% signifi cance level. The empirical analysis concludes that the rational expectation errors (gap between the anticipated and current infl ation) is not signifi cant in the most Eurozone Member States, excluding the aforementioned Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. It is possible to assume that the expectational error () e t PP  disappeared because the economic agents are able to calculate all disposable information to form their rational expectations about the future price level. The same assumption is probable in context of infl ation perceptions. However, the results of causality tests between the infl ation perceptions/anticipations and current observed infl ation are surprised. Table 6 and 7 presents the results of Granger non-causality tests -the causality between the perceived/anticipated infl ation and current observed infl ation. The tests failed to reject the hypothesis 1 = 2 = 0 and simultaneously reject the hypothesis 1 = 2 = 0 in the most of countries.
Except of Italy (1% signifi cance level), Luxembourg (1% signifi cance level) and Portugal (5% signifi cance level) perceived infl ation has no impact on the current infl ation. Infl ation anticipations have no impact on the current observed infl ation in the most analysed countries, except of Belgium (5% signifi cance level), Portugal (5% signifi cance level) and Spain (10% signifi cance level). According to these results, the hypothesis about the causality existence between the infl ation anticipations/perceptions was rejected in Granger sense in the most Eurozone Member States.
Discussion
Heinemann and Ullrich (2006) based their analysis of the impact of EMU on infl ation expectations on the representation of expectations formation suggested, among others, by Carlson and Valev (2002) and Gerberding (2001) . These take in account the empirical fact that the expectations formation can only partially be characterized to be fully rational and that backward looking and adaptive expectations play a role at least for a subset of economic agents 7 . Furthermore, authors incorporate a term capturing the regressive part of expectations formation and the possibility that the expected infl ation rate can change in reaction to a changing current infl ation rate (Pesaran, 1985, p. 951) . They also stress that expectations tend to underpredict the infl ation rate during periods of rising infl ation and overpredict this rate during periods of decreasing infl ation. This fi nding is the frequent result of studies on infl ation expectations (e.g. Andolfatto et al., 2002) . Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) highlighted the importance of psychological factors, and especially the role of prior expectations. Based on an experiment, they show a bias towards a perception of price increases as a result of a previously held expectation, even when the latter was not confi rmed by the evidence 8 . A completely different factor relates to the fact that consumers may have incorrectly interpreted the loss of purchasing power incurred at the time of the changeover as being caused by higher infl ation rather than by the general slowdown in economic activity at that time. Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2006) have found some evidence in favour of this argument in the case of Italy, but in principle this argument should also have led to infl ation misperceptions in other periods characterized by an economic downturn.
7
This argument supports the close relation between the evaluation of the past development of prices (an indicator of perceived infl ation) and expected infl ation (future price development).
8 This is exactly the case of perceived infl ation and its signifi cant deviation from HICP. Lindén, S. (2005) The unit root test is made for each member country of the Eurozone individually. Aucremann, Collin and Stragier (2007) in their empirical analysis use the panel unit root test because of low power of unit root tests in short samples since in such cases they tend not to reject the null hypothesis, even if the latter is not true. The authors of this paper assume that there is a different economy structure and transmission mechanism affecting the agent behaviour in each Eurozone Member State. The problem of an insuffi cient number of observations and unit root test robustness could be solved by individually estimated critical values based on the Monte Carlo simulation methodology, but the time series used cover 144 observations. Critical values used in this paper are sourced from Hamilton (1994) and depend on a sample size of 25, 50, 100, 250 and 500 observations.
Conclusions
The rational expectation hypothesis and Lucas´s critique of the negative slope Phillips curve is a very strong argument for economic policy recommendations. Of course, the authors distinguish the rational expectation hypothesis from the adaptive expectation hypothesis. While the rational expectation hypothesis is based on the forward-looking expectations, the adaptive expectation hypothesis is associated with backward-looking expectations. In the empirical analysis the authors use infl ation perceptions as well as anticipations and test if the current price level is different from the perceived and anticipated prices. The results presented in Tables 2, 3 , 4 and 5 show, that perceived or anticipated infl ation differs mostly from its current level (HICP) but returns back in the long-run.
This conclusion leads to the idea of overrating the impact of infl ation perceptions or anticipations on the economies. As the empirical results are not robust (lag order identifi ed by Akaike´s information criterion is too high), the authors used Granger non-causality test to identify causality between the infl ation perceptions/anticipations and observed infl ation.
The role of the perceived infl ation, like the exogenous shock that leads to the expected future consumption reduction, was rejected because the gap between its observed and perceived/anticipated level is not signifi cant. Subsequently, the causality existence between the perceived/anticipated and its observed values was rejected in Granger sense (Tables 6 and 7) .
The reality is, of course, that some products and services may see individual one-time price increases due to prices being rounded up, or because of new price calculations or unforeseen events (such as crop failures or external price shocks). Growth in individual prices might also occur as a result of attempts by retailers to take advantage of the euro's introduction to enact otherwise unrealizable, purposeful, coordinated price hikes.
This type of movement in the structure of prices, however, has had a relatively minor infl uence on the HICP index. At the same time, the impact on the narrowed index of monetary expenditures cannot be compared to the growth in indicators of perceived infl ation, as has taken place in all countries of the Eurozone with the exception of Slovakia.
In spite of that, as a consequence of individual price movements and the impact of other factors (media infl uence, continued calculation of prices in euros in the domestic currency thereby creating a comparison of current and past prices, the use of other nominal values in the new currency, inbuilt expectations, etc.) consumers have gotten the impression that introduction of the euro is associated with signifi cant price hikes across the board. This feeling (perception) has persisted for a long time.
Even if growth in perceived infl ation were to have no relevant impact on infl ationary expectations and macroeconomic stability, it might still signifi cantly reduce the level of support for introduction of the euro among the citizenry, cut consumer confi dence and lower faith in the offi cial statistics. That's why we consider it misplaced to hear the problem of perceived infl ation as some species of insoluble, necessary evil whose economic costs will in any event be negligible.
9 Economic policymakers should thus aim at minimizing the growth of perceived infl ation at the least during the period of transition to the euro, while attempting the fastest possible realignment of its dynamics with those of the HICP index. 9 Hampl (2007) speaks about "the battle which cannot be won" in regard to perceived infl ation. He also opines that the impact of perceived infl ation should not be overestimated. He considers any growth in indicators of perceived infl ation as simply one of the costs of entry into the Eurozone.
